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COMPETITION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
DAVID

I.

P.

FIDLER*

INTRODUCTION

of the most prominent features in the history of competition law in
the United States and Europe in the past three decades has been the
extent to which systems of competition law have had to adjust to international conditions and forces. The importance of the international market place and foreign competition is now considered obvious. This
awakening to things international, however, has not been accompanied
by much thinking about how competition law relates to the international
environment in which it operates. Individual issues, like extraterritorial
enforcement, have been discussed in some detail; but what is lacking is an
attempt to relate competition law in a broader way to international
relations. This article makes an initial and incomplete attempt to provide
a wider framework in which to analyse the relationship between competition law and international relations.
Creating such a framework may, at first glance, seem to relate two
spheres of activity and study that are vastly different. International
relations, traditionally viewed, involves the interaction of States and
international organisations within the international system. Competition
law, on the other hand, addresses primarily the behaviour of private
economic actors. Relating these two areas, however, is not to work at
cross purposes because, as will be demonstrated throughout this article,
the distinction between a public realm of competition transpiring between States and a private sphere of competition occurring between
private entities is somewhat artificial. Private economic behaviour and its
regulation directly affect how States and international organisations
behave. Gilpin writes that "economic factors have played an important
role in international relations throughout history" and that: "Events in
the final years of the twentieth century are forcing students of international relations to focus their attention on the inevitable tensions and
continuing interactions between economics and politics."' An increasing
amount of business literature devotes attention to analysing economic
competition within the international environment. 2 A similar awareness
ONE
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1. R. Gilpin, Political Economy ol International Relations (1987), p. 3 .
2. See e.g. M. Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations (199)) and K. Ohmae,
Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the hiterlinked Economy (1990).
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of the impact of international relations on competition law among legal
practitioners and commentators will enhance appreciation of competition law in its contemporary international milieu. The framework provided here, though basic and skeletal, can perhaps serve as a starting
point, or at least a stimulation, for further thinking about this increasingly
important relationship.
11. BUILDING THE FRAMEWORK

THE framework set out here builds on basic concepts from international
relations theory: the State, the international system, and the international society.' The analysis will examine how competition law relates
to each of these levels of international relations. Once the composite
picture of competition law as an aspect of international relations develops, the internationalfeatures of competition law can be more clearly
appreciated. Such appreciation will allow some tentative conclusions
about dealing with competition law as a part of international relations.
A difficult feature of this approach is maintaining a workable definition
of "competition law". In many ways, global economic contact and interdependence erase distinctions between competition, industrial, social
and trade policies. Very different types of laws affect the conditions or
environment of competition within and between States, which expands
greatly the task of legal analysis. For example, as indicated by the
inclusion of Articles 92-94 in the competition section of the Treaty of
Rome, the European Community (EC) considers State aids as immediately relevant to competition policy and law. Similarly, Article 101 of
the Treaty allows the European Commission to take measures to override
national laws and regulations that distort "the conditions of competition". Such distortions of competition provide incentives for harmonisation of laws in such areas as financial services and environmental and
consumer protection. "Competition law", therefore, potentially has very
wide scope, encompassing all laws that effect the conditions of
competition.
I have, however, employed a more limited meaning of competition
law, for two reasons. First, the wide interpretation would expand this
article beyond reasonable bounds. Second, the wide interpretation is
analytically overinclusive as almost every law affects the conditions of
competition in some way. The wide interpretation has no observable
boundary that could give shape to legal analysis. "Competition law" as
used in this article primarily refers to those laws and rules directed at the
competitive behaviour of economic entities. As I hope to demonstrate,
even this more limited (but workable) definition of competition law
3. Sce H. Bull. Anarchical Society (1977).
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produces many interesting and complicated issues when analysed within
the milieu of international relations.
Ill.

COMPETITION LAW AND THE STATE

study of international relations is a vast and often controversial field
of enquiry. Crudely speaking, international relations theory attempts to
understand and explain human behaviour beyond the borders of the
State. International relations theory also tries to address the impact of
such behaviour on politics, economics and morality inside the State.
Although many aspects of international relations theory remain topics of
intense debate, virtually all commentators on the subject acknowledge
the importance of the State. International theories, like MarxismLeninism, that attempted to diminish the importance of the State and to
elevate non-State forces to primary positions have failed to be realistic or
normatively persuasive. The importance of the State in international
relations, however, does not mean that non-State forces and actors play
insignificant roles. When considering the international aspects of competition law, one must recognise that international organisations, multinational corporations and even individuals can influence events. 4 The
impact of such non-State actors, however, is largely filtered through the
policies, ambitions and fears of States.
The EC provides interesting material on this very point. It is, of course,
not a State in the traditional sense. The rules for competition set out in the
Treaty of Rome and as interpreted by the European Commission and
European Court of Justice provide, however, one example of how States
have decided to deal with competition law at the international level. The
European Commission, further, acts like a single State from the perspective of other States because it has quasi-sovereign power in the competition area that it exercises on behalf of the entire EC. EC competition law
by itself contains rich material for examining competition law as an aspect
of international relations. 5
If a State adopts a system of competition law, that system can be
characterised as a "national interest". To describe competition law as a
national interest means that the State believes that competition and its
THE

4. The story of the impact of one individual is told in S. Adams, Roche versus Adams
(1984). Adams supplied the European Commission with information about his employer's
(Hoffmann-La Roche) violations of EC competition law. A Swiss court convicted Adams in
absentia of criminal espionage.
5. The European Commission's recent De Havilland decision is a good example of the
international relations aspects of EC competition law: the Commission prohibited the
acquisition of a Canadian subsidiary of a US corporation by a joint venture of Italian and
French companies. This decision caused serious political controversy in France and Italy
and was also condemned by the European Parliament. See 'EC Legislature Assails Com15
mission's Veto of Plane Deal". International Herald Tribune, II Oct. 1991, p. , and
2
"Brittan Defends Ban on European Takeover of Dc Havilland". idem, 14 Oct. 1991, p. .
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regulation serve values and interests deemed important to a polity for
domestic and international reasons. The notion of competition law as a
national interest corresponds with the growth of competition law systems
in many liberal, democratic States. Competition law has become part of
the capitalist ethos in many democratic societies, and serves as a national
interest in a number of ways. First, it reflects or embodies many of a
State's most basic principles and beliefs. Debates about the nature and
purpose of US anti-trust legislation demonstrate how competition law
can relate to a society's core values. As Fox and Sullivan argued: "The
basic difference between Chicagoans and traditionalists is a difference of
vision about what kind of society we are and should strive to be." ' The
recurrent theme in US anti-trust literature, that anti-trust legislation
supports the continued vibrancy and resilience of democratic institutions
and processes, resonates with a deep sense of how important such laws
are to the United States. As Pitofsky writes, "Congress has in its antitrust
enactments ... exhibited a clear concern that an economic order dominated by a few corporate giants could, during a time of domestic stress or
disorder, facilitate the overthrow of democratic institutions and the
installation of a totalitarian regime." 7 Seeing competition law as a
national interest extends beyond concerns about the make-up of domestic society. The fear of totalitarian exploitation of concentrated private
economic power present in US anti-trust legislative history makes little
sense without reference to fears about foreign States and ideologies. The
fear is generated as much by international relations as by domestic
concerns. This connection between domestic and international political
concerns relating to competition law impressed itself on Franklin Roosevelt when he compared the US commitment to anti-trust with Nazi
manipulation of industrial cartels: "cartels were utilised by the Nazis as
governmental instrumentalities to achieve political ends ... Defeat of the
Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these weapons
of economic warfare."' The Nazi experience of Hitler's use of and support from German cartels also influences the nature and spirit of German
competition law. Similarly, Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome
relate directly to the aspirations to create a united, peaceful Europe
through economic integration. ' EC Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan

6. E. Fox and L. Sullivan, "'Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
Coming From'? Where Are We Going?" (1987) 62 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 957.
7. R. Pitofsky, "The Political Content of Antitrust" (1979) 127 U. Penn. L.Rev.
1053-1054.
8. Quoted in J. Davidow, "The Seeking of a World Competition Code", in 0. Schacter
and R. Hellawell (Eds). Competition in International Business (1981). p.

36 2

.

9. The Schuman Declaration of May 1951. which is the genesis document of the EC,
stated that European federation was vital for future European peace, which makes competition law an integral component in a profound vision of European society.
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recently expressed the EC's perception of the importance of competition
law to free market democracy in Europe: "We have to provide an
example for the fragile democracies and even more vulnerable economies
of Eastern Europe. When they look at what binds the twelve memberStates together in a Community, they notice that at the heart of its
successful market economy lies a sound competition policy.""'
Second, competition law directly touches on issues relating to a State's
economic well-being and power, which are clearly matters pertinent to
the national interest. US, British and European authorities have at
different times shown concern at the way in which competition law affects
the economic power and competitiveness of their respective economic
players. Part of the success of Chicago school anti-trust thinking during
the Reagan administration could be found in the message that traditional
anti-trust thinking weakened the ability of US companies to compete
effectively with foreign challengers. Section 84 of the British Fair Trading
Act 1973 specifically lists as one key factor in evaluating the "public
interest" how British companies are faring in the international market
place."' Part of the motivation for some of the European Commission's
decisions in the early 1980s on joint venture agreements relates to fears
that European industry was falling behind American and Japanese competitors. 2 In its criticisms of the recent De Havilland decision, the
European Parliament "called for a revision of the European Community's competition law to force the Commission to consider global competitiveness of EC industry and jobs when reviewing such transactions"."
Third, competition law converges with other important national interests. Competition law, for example, sometimes includes national security
as one of its objectives. National security concerns in competition law
appear in two contexts: in purely domestic situations and in those involving foreign elements. A purely domestic example in the United Kingdom
can be found in GEC's proposed takeover of Plessey. GEC wanted to
create a unified British telecommunications and defence electronics firm

10. Speech of Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan to the EC Chamber of Commerce in New
York on 26 Mar. 1991). Extracted in 119901 4 C.M.L.R. 324.
II. S.84 of the Fair Trading Act states that the MMC should take into account in
determining the public interest the desirability "of maintaining and promoting competitive
activity in markets outside the United Kingdom on the part of producers of goods, and of
suppliers of goods and services, in the United Kingdom".
12. See e.g. the Commission's 13th Annual Report on Competition Policy (1983) and
Optical Fibres (1986) O.J. L236/30, Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra 1198814 C.M. L.R. I ll, Konsortium ECR (1990) O.J. L228/31, and ODIN (1990) O.J. L209/l5.
13. -EC Legislature ... ", loc. cit. supra n.5. The De Havilland case has increased
interest and concern over EC merger control procedures. See "Bangemann Proposes
Changes to EC Merger Review Procedures", 1992: "The External Impact of European
Unification, 18 Oct. 1991, p. 1.
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that could compete more effectively in the increasingly competitive international electronics markets. In its report under the merger provisions of
the Fair Trading Act, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission ("Monopolies Commission") concluded that the proposed merger would operate
against the public interest because, inter alia, it would reduce competition
in the domestic defence electronics industry, which would hurt British
national security. 4 National security, therefore, was an important part of
the "public interest" the Fair Trading Act was meant to protect.
More frequently, the objective of national security arises in situations
where foreign firms seek to take over or control major national economic
interests. The United States, for example, has been nervous about
foreign ownership of American high-technology companies because of
the defence and strategic interests involved. 15High technology, however,
is not the only area where the national security concern appears. Looking
again at the British Fair Trading Act, the Monopolies Commission
declared that the merger situation created by the Kuwait Investment
Office's stake in British Petroleum operated against the public interest
because it placed a vital strategic resource under threat from a foreign
government with conflicting oil interests."' Further, the so-called Lilley
doctrine of referring takeovers of British firms by foreign State-owned
enterprises involves the notion that foreign public ownership is harmful
to competition in the United Kingdom. The EC's Merger Control Regulation also displays the marks of States' concerns with national security.
Under Article 21 of EC Regulation 4064/89, member States are empowered to protect "legitimate interests" in merger situations, which
include concerns about "public security". 7
Fourth, competition law represents a national interest as well because
it supports notions of national identity and image. In the United States,
the term "antitrust" is laden with many political and social overtones that
connect it to aspects of the national character. The anti-trust concept
14. See GEC/Plessey Cmnd.9867 (1986).
15. Gilpin, op. cit.
supra n.I, at p.201.
16. See Kuwait Investment Office/BP Cm.477 (1988). National security, however, has
not been an objective of EC competition law because the EC institutions have no competence in the security, defence and foreign policy areas. Arms procurement, for example, is
exempted from EC competition rules. If the EC moves closer to a unified defence policy,
EC competition law will face the question of European national security as well.
Apparently, the issue of competition in the defence area is becoming a focus of attention as
NATO has formulated proposals to promote freer arms trade among its member States (see
"NATO Considers Allied Cost-Cutting". International Herald Tribune, 13 May 1991, p.6);
and EC Competition Commissioner Brittan has threatened scrutiny of European defence
industries under competition rules to catch protection of dual-use production of products
that have primarily civilian uses (see "Brittan Targets Defense", International Herald
Tribune, 31 Oct. 1991, p. 11).
17. See Art.21 of EC Reg.4064/89 (1989) O.J. 395/1, corrected version at (1990) O.J.
L257/13.
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contains the belief in free enterprise, an economic populism, and concern
about the arbitrary use of private and public power. Legislative histories
of the various anti-trust statutes bear these observations out." The prudential and discretionary features of much of British competition law
remind one of the perceived pragmatism of the British national character.
Germany also closely associates its competition law with its national
identity, as the presence of the "German clause" in EC Regulation
4064/89 indicates; the clause provides for a special process to deal with
concentrations affecting competition on "distinct" national markets. 9
The clause is what remains of the German effort to preserve the jurisdiction of the Bundeskartellamt in merger matters, which suggests how
strongly the Germans are attached to their vigorous system of competition law. 2' Similarly, the European Commission realises the importance
of EC competition law in building a sense of European-ness among the
member States and in demonstrating to non-EC States and companies
that the European Community is not a figment of the imagination. Many
of the seminal cases in EC competition law arose when the Commission
went after large non-EC undertakings. 2' The unspoken part of the purpose for doing so was to impress upon outsiders the reality of the EC as a
force to be reckoned with.
These various manifestations of competition law as a national interest
demonstrate that it can be very important to States that adopt it. It must
be kept in mind, however, that the absence of competition law in most
States in the world represents definite national interests as well. States
that do not partake of the competition ethos of capitalist countries often
express their national interests in ways hostile to economic competition.
The socialist perspective adopted by Communist States and many developing countries discouraged or oppressed competition on the political
and economic level and opted for centralisation and monopolisation of
political and economic power. Consensus on the value of competition
law, however, can suffer without taking into account States with radically
different ideological assumptions. The fact that two capitalist States
consider competition law important does not mean that the content of

18. See e.g. the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act (15 USC, s.13). which is
filled with the desire to protect small shop owners from large retailers.
19. See Art.9(2) of EC Reg.4064/89.
20. T. Stahl. "Competition-Oriented Merger Control: A Tool for Unifying the European
Communihy", International Merger Law, Oct. 1991, pp. 16-17. In relation to Reg.4064/89,
Brittan has said: "As far as Germany is concerned, we even put in a special clause insuring
the right to maintain a vigorous competition policy of their own. That was protected at their
insistence": see "Brittan Defends...
loc. cit. supra n.5.
t"
21. See e.g. ICI v. Commission 119721 C.M.L.R. 557, Continental Call 119731 C.M.L.R.
199. United Brands v. Commission 119781 1 C.M.L.R. 429. Hoffinann-La Roche 1197913
C.M.L.R. 211 and Tetra Pak (1991) O.J. L290/35.
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their respective "national interests" in competition law converges. Finally, peculiar cases complicate the picture even more. Japan, for example,
clearly values capitalism; but the contrast between Japanese and US
treatment of domestic cartels is dramatic. The absence of a strong system
of competition law in Japan represents uniquely Japanese attitudes about
capitalism. The example of Japan reinforces earlier observations: the
regulation (or lack thereof) of economic competition by a State reflects
the complex set of beliefs and objectives that create a national interest.
As a result, when competition law becomes an issue beyond the State, a
whole host of national beliefs, assumptions and fears go along to complicate matters even more.
IV.

COMPETITION LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

international system is a system of States "founded when two or
more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient
impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave-at least in
some measure-as parts of a whole". 22 Such contact, impact and interaction between States occur in a system characterised by the lack of a
supreme authority. There is no "command of the sovereign" to keep
States in line as governments keep citizens within the law. A kind of
anarchy always lurks within the international system. The anarchy is
often frustrating and sometimes dangerous, and its presence colours all
behaviour within the international system. The damage to nations that
such anarchy can wreak greatly stimulated the European project that
continues to unfold today.
Commerce and trade constitute one of the characteristic features of the
international system as States constantly interact economically..2 3 International relations theory has focused on the meaning and effects of
economic interaction within and upon the international system. In order
to understand how competition law relates to the international system, I
will first briefly look at some of the major arguments about the nature of
economic intercourse in the international system. I will then examine if
competition law exhibits any of the characteristics described by the
different traditions of thought on international economic interaction.
The first tradition of thought, realism, stresses that economic interaction between States should be viewed as part of the pattern of power
politics that characterises international relations. Rousseau, one of the
deepest realists, argued that trade and commerce between States fostered

THE

22. Bull, op. cit. supra n.3, at pp.9-10.
23. "'Trade is the oldest and most important economic nexus among nations. Indeed,
trade along with war has been central to the evolution of international relations": Gilpin,
op. cit. supra n.l,at p.171.
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24
and created conflict, turmoil and violence in the international system.
Economic interaction, therefore, resembles a struggle for advantage,
position and power. 2" In contrast to realism, the liberal tradition of
thought maintains that economic contact between States encourages
political, economic and moral interdependence that can act as a tempering force in relations between States. Trade and commerce ameliorate
the harshness of the international system by building ties and contacts
between private citizens of different States; and by creating between
States concrete mutual interests that require co-operation to preserve. In
the liberal perspective as expounded by Kant, for example, economic
interdependence slowly forces States to require peace in order to pursue
their interests. 2 ' Trade and commerce transform the nature of power
politics so that international relations no longer seems like a zero-sum
game. The pursuit of advantage ranks below the need for co-operation.
The liberal perspective includes a place for international law and international organisations to assist the process begun by economic interdependence. 27 The third major tradition of thought, socialism, takes a still
different approach to economic interaction in the international system.
The socialist perspective holds that patterns of trade and commerce
reflect the exploitative prerogative of capitalist States. The dynamics of
an international system driven by capitalist forces creates injustice as the
system subordinates the welfare of many peoples to the affluence and
hegemony of the few capitalist powers. Economic interaction perse is not
evil; rather, the socialist perspective targets a particular way of organising
such interaction. The solution to the injustice is to change radically the
patterns and assumptions about trade and commerce maintained by
capitalism.2'
The interaction between competition law and the international system
reveals aspects of all three traditions of thought about economic behaviour in international relations. This is not to argue that systems of competition law expressly appeal to these traditions of thought; rather, it is to
suggest that competition law relates to the international system in a very
complex way, which will now be outlined in more detail.

24. Sec -Introduction", in S. Hoffmann and D. P. Fidler (Eds), Rousseau on InternationalRelations (1991), p. xlvi.
25. The realist perspective is sometimes called the nationalist perspective. For a more
detailed analysis of this perspective, see Gilpin. op. cit. supra n. 1, at pp.31-34. 46-50.
26. On Kant's international relations thinking, see K. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and
War" (1962) 56 Am. Pol. Science Rev. 331-340) F. H. Hinsley. "Kant". in his Power and the
Pursuit of Peace (1967), pp.62-80: and A. Hurrell. "Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in
International Relations" (1990) 16 Rev. Int. Studies 183-205.
27. For a more detailed examination of the liberal perspective, see Gilpin. op. cit. supra
n. I, at pp. 26 - 3 1 , 43-46.
28. For a more detailed account of the socialist perspective. see idem, pp.34-41, 51-54,
270-290, 298-301.
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Competition Law and National Power

Systems of competition law have proved to be very aware of features of
the international system emphasised by realism. First, almost every
major system of competition law contains an explicit or implicit acknowledgement that economic behaviour which would be intolerable within
the borders of the State is acceptable beyond those borders. The United
States, for example, explicitly sanctions export cartels that would not
survive anti-trust legislation if implemented domestically.-" Schedule 3(6)
to the British Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 exempts horizontal
export cartels from the strictures of registrability. More subtly, the drafters of the Treaty of Rome limited the prohibitions in Articles 85 and 86 to
restrictions on competition that affect trade between member States.
Restrictions on competition that affect only non-EC trade are presumably legal under EC competition law.
Such provisions clearly indicate that States consider competition within
and beyond the State to be governed by very different rules. The nature
of the international system, therefore, influences how States view competition law. In the international system, economic competition between
private undertakings takes place against background concerns for
national wealth and power. States, as a result, allow their national undertakings to take full advantage of the licence provided by the international
system. These export cartel provisions remind one of the realist tenet that
economic power is political power in the international system. What
Roosevelt condemned as "weapons of economic warfare" are permitted
to exist internationally by systems of competition law.
Second, competition law systems exhibit concerns about national
power by using competition law to protect domestic autonomy from
foreign influences. Since the international system encourages raw forms
of economic activity, States, including those without a competition law,
maintain vigilant watch over the practices of foreign undertakings. Developing countries' problems with multinational corporations illustrate this
phenomenon.' But States with a competition law keep watch as well, and
sometimes use competition rules to control the power of foreigners in the
domestic economy. The issue often arises in the context of mergers,
where foreign companies attempt to take over or gain control of domestic
undertakings. 31 Mention has already been made of the concerns of competition law authorities in the United States and United Kingdom about
foreign control of economic assets deemed important to national
security. The UK competition law authorities have expressed concerns
29. Webb-Pomerane Act, 15 USC. ss.61-66.
30. Discussion of the role of multinational corporations in international economics can
be found in Gilpin, op. cit. supra n. 1,at pp.231-262.
31. R. Whish. Competition Law (2nd edn, 1989), p.699.
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about domestic autonomy in areas other than defence technology. In
BMC/Pressed Steel the Monopolies Commission "did not condemn the
backward integration of BMC... since the alternative might be a foreign
take-over of Pressed Steel". In Shanghai Banking Corporation/Royal
Bank of Scotland it rejected the foreign takeover bid of a Scottish bank
because it was concerned about foreign control over national financial
institutions. 33 Kuwait Investment Office, BMC/Pressed Steel and Shanghai Banking illustrate that the Commission closely protects the domestic
control of important strategic economic assets like oil, steel and banking.
The political concerns or phobias about foreign influence, however, often
find expression in economic sectors that cannot be considered strategic
industries, as the political fuss over Nestld's takeover of Rowntree 34 and
the Lilley doctrine demonstrate. Another way in which the Commission
has expressed concerns about national power in merger policy is by
finding against proposed mergers that would negatively affect the UK
balance of payments by decreasing exports or increasing imports.3' The
concern about domestic autonomy and national competitiveness has also
recently appeared in the United States in calls for intelligence efforts
against foreign economic and corporate espionage in the United States. 6
Third, States take vigorous action to protect their economies and
competitiveness from "unfair" foreign competition. For example, both
the United States and the EC have well-developed anti-dumping rules
and procedures, which are used to punish foreign undertakings that dump
goods on to US or EC markets. 37 Although the basis for anti-dumping
legislation and similar rules is protection of domestic industry from
"unfair" foreign competition, the use of such laws often creates problems
fbecause enforcement seems like protection from vigorous, rather than
demonstrably unfair, foreign competition. The "screwdriver" provision
of Regulation 2423/88, for example, has been criticised for creating a de
facto local content requirement.35 More obviously, US law provides
protection for US industries threatened even by fair foreign
competition.3"
32. Idem. p.730. Sce BMC/Pressed Steel H.C.P. (:465-66) 46.
33. See Shanghai Banking Corporation/Royal Bank of 'Scotland Cmnd.8472 (1982).
34. Whish. op. cit. stpra n.31. at p.731.
35. Sec Dai'v/Rolhnakers H.C.P. (1974) 67. Rockware Ghass/Redjiarn National Glass
H.C.P. (1977-18) 431. Hiram Walker/Highland Distilleries H.C.P. (1979-80) 743. Enserchl
Davv International Cmnd.8360 (1981). Hepworth Ceramic Holdings/Streetlv Cmnd. 9164
(1984). and GKN/AE Cmnd.9199 (1984). Generally. see Whish. idem. pp.729-730.
36. The former CIA director William Webster "'advocated collecting more intelligence
on foreign threats to the US economy, such as companies that steal US trade secrets and
governments that use espionage to learn about US economic strategies": see "Wcbster's
3
CIA: Orderly Ship with No Destination". Itternational Herald Tribune, 10 May 1991. p. .
37. See 19 USC. s.1677 and EC Rcg.2423/88 (1988) O.J. L20)9/1.
Europe Without Frontiers: A Lawer's Guide (1989). pp. 102-104.
38. A. Winter etal.,
39. Sec s.201 of the Tariff Act of 1974, 19 USC. s.2253.
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Fourth, systems of competition law demonstrate national worries
about economic power by using competition law to permit actions otherwise questionable from other competition perspectives. The European
Commission, for example, has been adept at shaping its interpretation of
Article 85 to allow major European undertakings either to regroup in
tough economic times or to appropriate foreign technology. The
European Commission has granted Article 85(3) exemptions to so-called
"crisis cartels" between major European petrochemical producers.4 '
Korah has noted that the European Commission seems to exempt automatically any agreement that transfers foreign technology to EC undertakings.4' The European Parliament, France and Italy, however,
criticised the European Commission's De Havillanddecision because the
Commission failed to use Regulation 4064/89 to promote European
economic power.12 In the United States concerns about the competitiveness of American firms at home and abroad has led many leading commentators of opposing anti-trust schools to downgrade protection of the
small business person as an anti-trust objective from the importance
given to that objective by the original legislators. Chicago school antitrust analysis deals with the small business person rather ruthlessly ;13 but,
interestingly, such staunch anti-Chicago commentators as Fox and Pitofsky place much less emphasis on protecting the small business person."
The realist, of course, would approve of this shift in US anti-trust thinking
because it would be foolish to comfort oneself about the loss of national
competitiveness with the knowledge that the State had many small
shopkeepers.
Fifth, systems of competition law can project national power in the
international system through extraterritorial enforcement. The diplomatic controversies and problems generated by the extraterritorial enforcement of US anti-trust legislation are well known."5 The British reaction
to such US extraterritorial enforcement illustrates that the issue does rise
to the level of power politics. The British Protection of Trading Interests
Act 1980 revealed that the UK government considered extraterritorial
401. See ENI/Moniedison 119881 4 C.M.L.R. 444, and ICIIEnichem 119891 4 C.M.L.R.
54.
41. V. Korah, "'Critical Commeints on the Commission's Recent Decisions Exempting
Joint Ventures to Exploit Research that Needs Further Development' (1987) Eur. L.Rcv.
18. Sec cases Optical Fibres (1986) O.J. L236/30. BP/Kellogg 11986 2 C.M.L.R. 619,
Ieco/ Ford 119891 4 C.M.L.R. 40. and Olivetti/Cooo I 19901 4 C.M.L.R. 941.
42. The European Parliament said that the Commission "focused on 'technical aspects'
at the expense of the political aspect of the Community's general interest' ": "EC Legislature...
Io. cit. supra 1n.5.
t",
43. Whish. op. cii. supra n.31. at p.18.
44. See E. Fox. "The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium" (1981) 66 Cornell
L.Rcv. 1182. and Pitofsky. o/. ir spra n.7. at p.11158.
45. See A. Lowe. ExItraterritorial Jurisdiction (1983) and A. Neale and M. Stephens,
InternationalBusiness and National Jurisdiction (1988).
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enforcement of US anti-trust law to constitute a direct threat to UK
"trading interests". The Act has been described as part of the "legal
warfare" that transpired between the British and Americans on this
problem. 4" The British have not been alone in expressing a concern about
the projection of US power through extraterritorial enforcement: other
States have passed so-called "blocking statutes" to blunt US attempts to
enforce anti-trust laws extraterritorially.47 The Department of Justice,
however, is not the only competition law authority to experiment with
projecting its power in the international system through extraterritorial
enforcement. The European Commission, as is well known, has been
eager to apply EC competition law to foreign firms on the basis of an
effects doctrine alone. 4" Although the European Court has not embraced
the full-blooded effects doctrine, Commission extraterritorial enforcement under the Wood Pulp "implementation doctrine" still represents a
formidable weapon.4" Extraterritorial enforcement of EC competition
law is probably very important in the Commission's thinking as it is a clear
way to impress upon foreign undertakings and governments that the EC
has economic power in the international system.
B.

Competition Law and InternationalCo-operation

Largely because of the problems created by the affinity of competition
law with concerns over national power, States that share the competition
ethos have in various ways made competition law issues an area in which
to improve international co-operation. Since most of the States that have
competition law are liberal democracies, it is not surprising that problems
produced by competition law in the international system have been
addressed through the liberal perspective on economic interaction.
Efforts, therefore, have been made to reduce the friction competition law
can cause in economic interdependence.
The first type of effort in this direction has been unilateral restraint.
The diplomatic problems created by extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws were not completely lost on US courts, which developed a
somewhat more sensitive doctrine of extraterritorial enforcement. 5" The
European Court's hesitancy in Wood Pulp to embrace the Commission's
46. Chcshirc and North, Private InternationalLaw ( I Ith edn. 1987). p.375.
47. Sce L. Collins. "Blocking and Clawback Statutes" (1986) J. Bus. L. 372, 452.
48. Sec Wood Pulp 119851 3 C.M.L.R. 474.
49. On Wood Pulp see D. Langc and J. Sandagc, "The Wood Pulp Decision" (1989) 26
C.M.L.Rcv. 137. Extraterritorial enforccment of competition law remains very much a hot
topic. See "Reaching Across Bordcrs". Financial Times, 21 Mar. 1991, p. 2 5 .
5(1. Compare US v. ICI 105 F.Supp. 215 (1952) with limberhe Lumber Co. v. Bank o]
America 549 F.2d 597 (1976) and Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corporation 595 F.2d
1287 (1979).
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effects doctrine suggests a desire to place some limits on the extraterritorial effect of EC competition law. The Court was at pains to demonstrate
that the "implementation doctrine" conformed to the public international law principle of territoriality. Of course, the strict territorial
enforcement of British competition law provides the best example of
unilateral restraint. ' The benefits such unilateral restraints generate in
the international system, however, should not be exaggerated. They are
often reactions to political damage already done. If extraterritorial enforcement has provoked States to enact blocking statutes like the British
Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, judicial moderation after the
fact seems rather like a tardy admission that the initial policy was wrong.
Further, unilateral restraint might be a rather uncomfortable attitude in
an international system populated by export cartels and characterised by
rough international economic competition.
A second type of effort at international co-operation is more substantive; it involves bilateral diplomacy and agreements between States
to reduce the friction caused by competition law. Such agreements bring
competition law into the realm of public international law. Enforcement
of competition law has been a fertile ground for bilateral diplomacy. The
United States, for example, has concluded agreements with Canada,
Australia and Germany concerning co-operation in the enforcement of
competition law. 2 The EC concluded an agreement on competition law
matters with EFTA that governs the reciprocal enforcement of EC and
EFTA competition rules against nationals of the other community. 0
Association agreements between the EC and non-member States also
include provisions dealing with competition. Such bilateral diplomacy
also occurs on specific competition law matters. The United States and
the EC, for example, have entered into an agreement under which EC
steel exports to the United States are regulated.3'
A very interesting recent development in the area of international
co-operation on competition law matters is the Agreement between the
European Commission and the United States Regarding the Application
of Their Competition Laws signed on 23 September 1991. The United
States and European Commission agreed to notify the competition
authorities of the other as soon as they "become aware that their enforce-

51. See Whish, op. cit. supra n.31. at pp.383-387.
52. iem, p.383.
53. In Wood Pu/p 119881 4 C.M.L.R. 9(01, the ECJ addressed itself to this agrccment
when the Finnish wood pulp producers fined by the Commission claimed that their situation
was covered by the EC-EFTA agreement. The ECJ rejected the argument. stating that the
situation before it fell outside the scope of that agreement.
54. See F. Bcnvon and J. Bourgeois, "The European Community-United States Steel
Arrangement- (1984) C.M.L. Rev. 305. The ECJ has nterpretcd the effects of this agreement in Hoesch AG v. Bergrohr 119911 1 C.M.L.R. 383.
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ment activities may affect important interests of the other Party"." The
parties also agree to "'render assistance to the competition authorities of
the other Party in their enforcement activities". 5" Although this agreement does not divide jurisdiction or change existing law, the hope is that
the notification and consultation process will reduce and minimise competition law problems between the parties. Competition Commissioner
Brittan, further, has expressed a desire to conclude similar agreements
with Canada and Japan. Behind such efforts is a scheme to create a
multilateral competition law process to lessen the difficulties national
competition law systems cause in international relations. 7
Such diplomacy and agreements on competition law issues allow States
within the competition tradition to pursue the benefits of economic
interdependence while reducing specific sources of friction. This diplomatic activity demonstrates that States that value economic interdependence do not engage one another in the international system on strictly
realist terms. Democratic States obviously do not believe that economic
interaction is but a base struggle for power. A concern to preserve the
mutual benefits of economic interdependence qualifies the approval of
national power apparent in competition law systems. This qualification
indicates that States within the competition tradition perceive power in
the international system in a complex and sophisticated way. In keeping
with the liberal perspective, fears and concerns produced by the international system in competition law matters can be reduced by framing
rules to regulate State behaviour.
A third type of effort at international co-operation seeks to extend the
public international law of competition beyond a patchwork of bilateral,
ad hoc agreements. An example can be found in regional systems of
competition law. EC competition law is a regional system of public
international competition law monitored by an international organisation. Similarly, EFTA has treaty law on competition matters in Articles
13-17 of the Stockholm Convention.5' The EC and EFTA have very
recently negotiated a fusion of their regional competition law systems as
part of the draft treaty on the European Economic Area. Under this draft
treaty, the EC and EFTA have established a common set of competition
principles and procedures. The seven EFTA States will -adopt most of

55. Art.ll(I).
56. Art.IV(I).
57. Commissioner Brittan stated that the Agreement is a "first step'" to "prevent trouble
rather than deal with trouble" and to "avoid conflict rather than resolve conflict". Quoted in
D. L. Fox. "US-EC Antitrust Cooperation Accord". International Merger Law.Oct. 1991,
p.20.
39 9 1
58. See R. Middleton, Negotiating on Non-Torijj Distortion.s o" Trade (1975), pp. for a discussion of the EFTA treaty rules on competition.
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the EC's competition rules".5 A separate EFTA authority, however, will
be established with powers mirroring the European Commission's to deal
with competition "complaints about companies which generate more
than 33 per cent of their combined turnover in Efta countries"."' Mergers
triggering the EC's Merger Control Regulation will, however, be handled
by the European Commission."'
It is important to remember, however, that such regional systems of
public international competition law exist only as part of much wider
regional economic objectives. Regional public international competition
law, therefore, plays an integral part in attempts to achieve such ambitious goals as a free trade zone or economic union through integration.
The attachment of regional competition law to other political and economic goals may go a long way to explain the success of the EC and EFTA
systems and their future fusion. I will return to this point in the later
section on competition law and the international society.
Another example of the effort to push the public international law of
competition beyond bilateral agreements and regional arrangements has
been the endeavour to formulate a world code of competition law binding
on all States. Philosophically, the foundations for a concept of a world
competition code can be found in the ideas of the great Enlightenment
liberal thinker Kant, who posited that free trade could help tame the
international system under the influence of a Cosmopolitan Law that
allowed individuals to trade in foreign lands without persecution or
discrimination/ 2 Kant had abstractly envisaged an international system
in which private individuals and undertakings from different States competed with one another on what in modern parlance is called a level
playing field. Historically, the impetus for efforts at a world code came
from the United States during the Second World War. As already noted,
Roosevelt believed that German cartels were part of the evil system that
produced Hitler. In 1944 Roosevelt suggested that control of cartel
behaviour might be "achieved only through collaborative action by the
United Nations"." Roosevelt's idea was a radical one: it appears that he
suggested subjecting cartel behaviour not only in the international system
but also within States to United Nations authority. Such an idea clearly
intended that both private and public competition behaviour be regulated
by an international organisation.
Roosevelt's idea, however, suffered from serious theoretical and practical problems, namely the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention
59.
p.2.
60).
61.
62.
63.

A. Hill. "Twin Pillars to Govern Competition Policy". Financial Times. 23 Oct. 1991.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See sources cited supra n.26.
Ouotcd in Davidow, loc. cit. supra n.8.
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in the internal affairs of States. Any hope of formulating a world code
would have to proceed by getting States to agree to standard internal
competition rules and to co-operate in inter-State agreements on implementation and enforcement. This is how the process developed. In 1948
the Charter of the International Trade Organisation engineered by the
United States and United Kingdom contained a section condemning
restrictive business practices. A similar list of restrictive business practices was drafted into a UN document in 1952 which also recommended
creating a UN body to facilitate international anti-trust consultation
between States and to investigate complaints by member States. As
political tensions and changes in the international system permeated the
United Nations in the 1950s and 1960s. however, the country that had
played the leading role in pushing for a world competition code, the
United States, concluded that the concept of an international anti-trust
regime simply could not be achieved. Corwin dwards, an American who
"devoted his career to supporting and spreading antitrust doctrine",'
concluded in 1967 that "a global agreement was impractical because
many states used restraints of trade as a weapon against other countries
and rejected private enterprise as the optimum form for economic
activity" ."'
The United States and other Western countries, however, did not
completely end their participation in multilateral efforts to increase international co-operation on competition law matters. Western States have
focused attention, for example, on competition law issues within the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
OECD work on reducing the friction caused by competition law in the
international system has focused on three areas. First, OECD serves as a
valuable source of information and analysis on national competition laws
and policies. Second, it has "established consultation and conciliation
procedures whereby national governments can meet to reconcile conflicts
created by the extra-territorial application of national anti-trust policies" ' Third, OECD has formulated a set of voluntary Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, which includes a competition section encouraging private undertakings to "refrain from actions which adversely
affect competition in the relevant market by abusing a dominant position
of market power"."'
Efforts at multilateral co-operation on international competition law
matters have also taken place within the United Nations Conference on

64. Idein. p.361.
65. Idein, p.364.
66. T. Brewer, "International Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices" (1982) 16J.
World Trade Law 113-115.
67. Ibid.
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD). UNCTAD's efforts comprise four
main areas of activity. First, UNCTAD has served as a central collection
point for information and competition policies and practices throughout
the world. Second, it has made attempts to draft a model national
competition law mainly for the benefit of those newer States wishing to
adopt the system. Third, it has facilitated the negotiation of multilateral
agreements on specific economic areas. An UNCTAD-sponsored agreement, for example, regulates competition in the liner trade."' Fourth, it
exerted much energy in the 1970s in preparing an international code on
restrictive business practices. In 1980 the General Assembly endorsed
UNCTAD's Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules
for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices." ' )
UNCTAD's efforts, however, have not produced anything more than
voluntary guidelines for States. In no sense can the UNCTAD Set of
Equitable Principles qualify as rules of public international law on competition. The only public international law on competition issues remains
the rules contained in bilateral, regional and area-specific multilateral
agreements. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, the UNCTAD
effort to formulate an international competition code succeeded best in
highlighting the dramatic gaps that separated States on the issue of
private economic competition and its regulation.
The examples of unilateral restraint by States, bilateral diplomacy and
agreements, regional treaty regimes, and attempts at creating more universal rules for competition illustrate the extent to which States have
sensed the need to respond constructively to the problems caused by
national competition law in the international system. International cooperation and co-ordination find a place on the agenda of States concerned with matters of competition law. To some extent this fact both
balances the worries over national power and competitiveness and also
remains in tension with those worries. Such attempts at reducing the
friction created by competition law in economic interdependence
through self-imposed or negotiated rules illustrate the close affinity that
competition law States have with the liberal perspective on international
relations.
C.

Competition Law and InternationalEconomic Justice

Competition law's interaction with the international system has also
68. See UNCTAD Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Confercnccs 1974. UN
Doc.TD/RBP/CONF/10 (Apr. 1980). This Convcntion is implemented in the UK in the
Merchant Shipping (Liner Confcrcnces) Act 1982. For a dctailcd examination of how this
Convention relates to EC competition law, see the judgmcnt of the ECJ in Re Algerian
Shipping 119911 1 C.M.L.R. 586.
supra n.66, at pp. 109-112.
69. Brewer, op. cit.
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exhibited aspects of the third major tradition on economic behaviour in
international relations, socialism, which propounds that the pattern of
economic relations set by capitalism produced injustice and had to be
transformed radically. Competition law concepts became part of the
arsenal of the developing countries' efforts in the 1970s to create a New
International Economic Order (NIEO). As noted earlier, by the late
1960s the leading Western States had lost interest in fashioning a world
competition code. Developing countries, however, picked up the notion
of international rules for restrictive trade practices and refashioned it for
use in their drive for international economic justice. As Davidow writes,
"Developing countries' pressure for international RBP rules was
undoubtedly the primary factor in rejuvenating UN activity in this
field.""' As a result, formulating international restrictive business practices rules remained on the UNCTAD agenda throughout the 1970s. The
pressure from developing States culminated in the 1980 Set of Equitable
Principles endorsed by the General Assembly.
The ideas held by developing countries in the UNCTAD negotiations
were indeed radical, not to mention confrontational. Davidow states that
developing countries "sought international endorsement of the concept
that all corporate conduct that was injurious to, or not positively helpful
for, their development should be branded as restrictive and altered to
their specification" .7 ' The chief corporate villain was the multinational
corporation. Although the developing countries' position was seen as
outside "traditional" competition law thinking, the previous sections on
competition law and the State and the international system demonstrate
that what developing countries were in fact doing was laying bare their
perception that capitalist notions of "competition" between private
undertakings in reality worked as mechanisms of power politics used to
weaken the abilities of some States to challenge the status quo. When
developing States "redefined" the concept of restrictive trade practices,
their emphasis was on the restrictions they perceived capitalist forms of
competition placed on their economic development and on power inequalities between States to the exclusion of "traditional" competition
law concerns about horizontal concentrations or dominant positions of
private undertakings. The UNCTAD programme on restrictive business
practices thus mirrored the larger political objectives contained in the
NIEO movement: changing the hierarchy and patterns of power in the
international system. 72 A world competition code under this perspective

70. Davidow, op. cit.
supra n.8, at p.365.
71. hlem. p. 3 6 6 .
72. See R. W. Tucker. Inequality of Natios (1977) for an analysis of developing
countries' general demands for cconomic justice as an attempt to alter the power structure
of international relations.
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could represent nothing less than a complete reorganisation of the international system on egalitarian lines. "Competition law" could have no
other function than achieving international economic justice.
Developed States worked in UNCTAD throughout the 1970s to turn
the quest for international rules of competition back towards more familiar notions of competition and its regulation. Some of the ideological
heat between the Western States and the developing countries decreased
when the highly politicised issue of technology transfer became the focus
of a parallel set of UNCTAD negotiations. 7 Western delegations succeeded in diluting the radicalism of the developing countries' initial
perspective on restrictive trade practices so that the Set of Equitable
Principles reads in many places like rules from the major competition law
systems of developed States. Aspects of the negotiations, however, still
remained very difficult and controversial. Developing and socialist
States, for example, sought to prohibit export cartels in the international
rules. Western States wanted to permit national export cartels but prohibit international cartel agreements between different national export
cartels. No consensus could be reached on this issue, meaning that the Set
of Equitable Principles did not include any provision on export cartels.
The effort by developing States to remake notions of competition law
in the international system constituted a bold if unsuccessful attempt to
attach competition law to a non-liberal conception of international economic justice. Many factors must be considered in explaining the failure
at radical change, but one of the most important has to be the distribution
of economic power in the international system. The economic clout of the
developed States meant that any effort to change the patterns of economic interaction in the international system would not succeed without
their consent. This fact somewhat supports the complaint of the developing States about the international status quo. Yet it also points to a major
weakness in the developing countries' effort to transform competition
law in the international system. Arguments from "justice" rarely prove
strong enough to persuade States to relinquish power in an international
system that lacks a common sovereign and is marked by a dangerous
political anarchy. Phrasing some of those justice arguments in the language of competition law did nothing to change the dynamics of power in
the international system.
V.

COMPETITION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

THE last element of the framework developed in this article comprises the

relationship between competition law and international society. An
73. Davidow. op. cit. supra nX, at pp.369-370.
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international society "exists when a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that
they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions"." An international system and international society are not the
same thing. While an international society presupposes the presence of
an international system, an international system can operate without an
international society. Common interests and values that characterise the
general international society include the preservation of the system and
society of States, maintaining the independence and sovereignty of
States, the limitation of violence, keeping promises and peace.7 5 International relations theorists like Hedley Bull have argued that a general
international society of States does exist even if in a most minimal sense. 7"
The first question that should be asked about competition law and
international society is whether the former in any way constitutes an
element of the latter. The heterogeneous attitudes towards capitalism,
competition and their regulation that exist in the international system
suggest that competition law does not represent a common interest, value
or institution of the general international society. Davidow argued that
the history of international efforts to develop an international code of
competition law from Roosevelt to UNCTAD indicates that "controlling
restrictive business practices has been accepted as an international
goal". 77 This conclusion, however, exaggerates the achievement represented by the non-binding UNCTAD Set of Equitable Principles. Davidow himself doubts whether the UNCTAD rules will have any normative
effect," which strongly suggests that such international charters of competition law will remain somewhat hollow in an international society
where the majority of States do not share the competition tradition of the
capitalist West. This was a major reason why Corwin Edwards concluded
in 1967 that an international
agreement on restrictive business practices
7
would not succeed: 9
It cannot succeed if it includes countries that are widely divergent in their
legal and political systems or in the place that they give to private enterprise
... It cannot succeed if the participating states do not have a substantial
degree of common experience as to the nature of business enterprises and
of business practices.

74..
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Bull. op. cit. supra n.3. at p.13.
Idem,. pp. 16-20.
Sec idem, p.41.
Davidow, op. cir. supra n.8, at p.391.
Idem. p.372.
Quoted in idem. pp.364-365.
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The general international society does not exhibit any common interest
or value in competition and its regulation in relation either to the importance of competition within States or to the role of competition in the
international system and society.
Competition law and the control of its effects in the international
system are shared interests of only a small part of the wider international
society. In this sense, it represents a common interest of a specific
international society composed of the developed capitalist democracies. '
When competition law ventures beyond this select democratic international society, the results highlight the heterogeneity of the wider
international society. Two European Commission decisions illustrate this
point. In Aluminium Products it rejected sovereign immunity arguments
and applied Article 85 to Eastern European aluminium producers despite
the fact that under socialist law these producers were organs of their
respective States."' In Colombian Coffee it imposed Community law on
the export practices of a Colombian national coffee federation.5 2 Both
decisions reveal the philosophical and political gap between the liberal
commitment to private economic competition and other forms of political
and economic organisation and behaviour. In situations where one State
does not share another's competition ethos, the application of competition law to its economic practices might appear not only as intervention in
the affairs of other States but also as the exercise of economic hegemony
or neo-colonialism.
Within the much smaller democratic international society, competition
law can be considered as a common interest and value in a number of
ways. First, it directly relates to a shared interest in the process of
economic interdependence. Second, it supports the belief that economic
competition itself is an important common value. Sir Leon Brittan
appealed to both these considerations when he stated that the EC shares
with the United States "a commitment to competition as the driving force
of the market economy and to competition policy as the principal policy
response to structural changes in the market place".' Third, competition
8(1.
Thc dramatic political and economic changes in Eastern Europe represent a potential
widening of the specific intcrnational society of developed capitalist democracies. Some of
these emerging capitalist democracies have already included competition law as one of their
new national interests. See Bulgaria's Protection of Competition Act. Czechoslovakia's
Law on the Protection of Economic Competition. Hungary's Act LXXXVI of 1990 on
Prohibition of Unfair Market Practices. and Poland's Anti-Monopoly Act. Also see "Antitrust: One Important Component of the Transformation of Eastern Europe", International
Merger Law, Nov. 1991. pp. 18-19. Further, as part of free trade and economic agreements
with the EC,Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have agreed to adopt EC competition
law: see "Three Eastern European Countries to Adopt Key EC Antitrust Rules'" EC
4
Competition Law Report. 9 Dec. 1991. p. .
81. See Ahuminiumn Prodicts 119871 3 C.M.L.R. 813.
82. See Colombian CotN'e 119831 1 C.M.L.R. 713.
83. 119901 4 C.M.L.R. 324.
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law has become part of the substantive work of common institutions, as
illustrated by the work of OECD.
Although the democratic international society does seem to include
competition law as part of the societal fabric, the pattern of the weave is
not necessarily clear. First, as noted before, competition law can act as a
divisive mechanism as well as a shared international societal value. The
close association of competition law with issues of national power and
competitiveness creates tensions in the shared values of competition and
economic interdependence. Liberal States measure their national competitiveness against one another, which can produce friction in international economic relations. The strength of the common interest in
competition between free market States depends greatly on perceptions
of reciprocity. One reason "national competitiveness" remains a problem
is that some States sense that economic relations do not function on a
reciprocal basis. Such perceptions of "them" and "us" among free market
States weaken the fabric of democratic international society. One result
of this weakened fabric is what Gilpin sees as the "rise of economic
regionalism" where "loose regional blocs" form, creating fissures in the
liberal economic order. 4 American trade difficulties with Japan and fears
about "fortress Europe" play an important part in the Bush administration's efforts at creating a North American free trade zone. The fact that
many liberal democracies have systems of competition law does not
translate automatically into international relations free from problems
related to competition and its regulation.
Second, the closer one looks at particular systems of competition law
the harder it becomes to detect much agreement between liberal States
about what competition law is supposed to do. As illustrated by the
debate between the Chicago school and traditionalists in the United
States, finding consensus within a single State about the function of
competition law can be difficult. Similar internal debates have arisen in
the United Kingdom and the EC. In the United Kingdom the Conservative government developed plans to replace the Restrictive Trade Practices Act with a system modelled on Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome
because the latter was, inter alia, perceived to be more favourable to the
government's emphasis on competition.' Critics of the European Commission's interpretation of Articles 85 and 86 reveal that the purposes of
EC competition law remain a controversial topic. Those urging the
development of a European "rule of reason" contrast distinctly with
those who believe that the Commission must continue to maintain a firm
grip on the competition law process. At the heart of this debate are strong
differences about the proper role of a system of competition law. If
84. Gilpin. op. cit. supra n. 1.at pp.396-397.
85. Sec Opening Markets: New Polic'v on Restrictive T)ade Practices Cmi.727 (1989).
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competition law is a shared value within certain democratic societies, it is
often difficult to define exactly what the value means. This difficulty
makes the task of identifying the content of a democratic international
societal value of competition law very hard.
Third, despite the fact that democratic countries have entered into
bilateral agreements to resolve competition law problems and have coordinated information-sharing and conciliation services within OECD,
there appears to be little consensus on or even consideration of the proper
role of competition law in a liberal international society. At present, its
role seems to be to create brush fires in the liberal international society
that have to be extinguished in an ad hoc fashion. The strategy pursued by
the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s was an attempt to
create a constructive international role for competition law. The strategy,
however, contained two flaws that rendered it impotent. First, it
attempted to include States that were outside or even hostile to the
competition ethos. Second, the strategy projected domestic concepts of
competition law on to a radically different political environment. Defining a role for competition law in the international system, if only between
liberal States, must still take account of the basic realities of international
relations. The question remains open whether such an international role
even within the liberal international society can go beyond the mechanical services of information provision and facilitation of dispute settlement provided by OECD to include something more substantive. The EC
and EFTA might be held up as examples of how competition law can play
such a substantive role between liberal States. But, as indicated earlier,
the EC and EFTA rules on competition only form parts of much larger
endeavours. Would it be possible to create a substantive international
role for competition law between the EC and the United States, for
example, without the grander vision of economic integration leading to
'
political union? I seriously doubt it."
The recent European Commission-US Agreement mentioned earlier might be seen as an initial step
towards a more substantive international role for competition law, but
the agreement itself promises no such role. It specifically states in Article
IX that it shall not affect or change the existing competition law of the
parties. The potential remains for consultation and co-operation to break
down because separate national interests prove stronger than the desire
for co-ordination. 7
86. Sir Leon Brittan entertains no such doubts as he has proposed that worldwide
competition law rules should be formulated within the GATT. Sir Leon's proposals contain
echoes of the earlier unsuccessful effort at universalising competition law: see 'Brittan
Urges Role for GAT" in Competition Rculation", Financial imes, 3 Feb. 1992. p. 1.
87. The co-operation function of the Agreement is itself limited significantly by Art.
VI I's restriction on the exchange of information considered confidential under the respective systems of competition law. If the US Antitrust Division and the European Commission
merely exchange publicly available information, the substantive value of the pact must be
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Finally, although liberal States do constitute a unique international
community, their susceptibility to the pressures of international politics
should not be forgotten. As Rousseau predicted, the international system
forces a democratic State to compare itself with other States in order to
know itself." This process of comparison is not restricted to matters of
military strength. In the latter part of the 1980s, Paul Kennedy's Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers catalysed a growing sense of political angst in the
United States about its decline relative to Japan and the EC." The book
voiced fears that had been growing for some time about the United
States' "national competitiveness". Even those who fundamentally disagree with the idea of US decline admit that the United States is in danger
of losing its competitive edge in technology, industry and education. " A
similar process has occurred in the United Kingdom as it struggles to
come to grips with the momentum for European economic and political
union. Does it risk becoming the European outsider, unwilling or unable
to compete within the Community, for the sake of the principle of
Parliament's sovereignty? Signs of "nationalism" can also be detected in
the pace at which the European Commission seeks to achieve economic
union. Commissioners are well aware of the economic power that a
united Europe could wield in the international system. Not all aspects of
European nationalism, however, are so positive. The collapse of the
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe threatens to increase the already considerable list of States wanting to join the EC. The promise of a strong
European State stands in stark contrast to an EC diluted and overstretched in its efforts to welcome other States into the fold. There may be
growing worries in this area and pressures to preserve the EC only for
certain Europeans. These pressures could affect EC competition law, in
relation to whose future Frazer writes: "A tension between free competition and protectionism may therefore emerge as a new Community
problem.""'
The forces of international relations that compel liberal States to return
in fear or in pride to self-interest work against those interests and values
that make up the liberal international society. Competition law in both its
domestic and international contexts can show the effects of the operation
of these forces. Therefore, the focus of competition law can narrow and
become more nationalistic instead of widening to provide support for the
international society of liberal States. The spectre of protectionism and

questioned since the two parties prcsuinably will be consulting about matters already known
under substantive laws that arc not changed.
88. Rousseau. "The State of War", in Hoffmann and Fidlcr. op. cir supra n.24. at p.38.
89. See P. Kennedy. Rise and Fall ofithe Great Powers (1988).
91. Sec J. Nyc, Bound to Lead: 7Te Changing Nature o/Almerica, Power (1990).
91. T. Frazcr, "Compctition Policy after 1992: The Next Step" (1991) 53 M.L.R. 623.
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the use of competition law against foreign competitors lurk dangerously
close to the surface of liberal international society."'2
Vi.

CONCLUSION

IN this article I have attempted to take some tentative steps in understanding the theoretical and practical relationship between competition
law and international relations. At the heart of the relationship is the
uneasy conjunction of systems of policy and law promoting economic
competition between private enterprises in many countries and of a
system reflecting competition among States. As we have seen, the realist
does not believe that the two spheres of private and public competition
can remain distinct; competition between States will inevitably come to
dominate and harness private competition for purposes of State power.
The liberal perspective, on the other hand, hopes that private economic
competition and its regulation can reduce tensions in the international
system by creating strong international societal values and interests.
Under such a perspective, the competition between States reduces in
importance as co-operation replaces wary co-existence as the mode of
diplomatic activity. Reality, of course, mirrors neither of these views
exactly.
As part of the liberal belief in economic interdependence, the competition ethos has contributed to a diffusion and transformation of power in
the international system. Power has been diffused through the development of many areas of economic success (North America, Europe and
Asia). Economic power so dispersed helps maintain a balance of power
and a strong interest in all States engaged to maintain this balance and the
relative and mutual benefits that flow from it. Furthermore, it is inconceivable (as it was not in the seventeenth century)' 3 that the economic
powers of today (the United States, Japan and the EC) will resort to
violence and force to resolve controversies that arise from trade, commerce and international economic competition. The competition ethos,
as predicted by the liberal perspective, has helped influence the nature of
international relations.
As the tenacity of the idea of "national competitiveness" shows,
however, old ways of thinking about competition of any kind in international relations survive. While such fears will not lead to mercantile
92. Calls in the US for protectionist legislation and to target Japanese companies for
more rigorous anti-trust action exemplify this lurking danger. See T. Boone Pickens. "'The
Japanese Need to Hear About Antitrust Laws", International Herald Tribune, 29 Apr.
1991, p.4. Also see the editorial "Try Trade Negotiations", InternationalHerald Tribune, 26
Feb. 1992, p.6 . criticising suggestions made by US Attorney General William Barr that
extraterritorial enforcement of American anti-trust law should be used to fight perceived
unfair foreign competition.
93. On the wars of the merchants, see M. Howard, War in European History (1976),
pp.38-53.
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wars, they could produce mercantile policies that might damage the
competition ethos shared by the liberal international society. Such realist
concerns can erode the reciprocity of behaviour that underpins much of
the interdependence of competition in the international system. "State
competition" can still come to dominate or overshadow in people's minds
the process of private economic competition.
The reality of the situation, therefore, is that for better or for worse
competition and competition law intertwine with many forces at all levels
of international relations. The major trends in competition today-globalisation of markets and increasing concerns over national competitiveness-require a sophisticated understanding of the complex
interdependence between the competition ethos, the complicated structure of international relations and the powerful attitudes alive in international political life. Such an understanding should be desired not only
for the sake of academic interest but also for the prudent handling of the
competition ethos in future years. Addressing the future of the general
international order, Hedley Bull concluded that the international system
could remain viable only "if the element in it of international society is
preserved and strengthened"." Similarly. the prospects for the competition ethos in the international system depend upon the strength of competition and its regulation as a common interest and value between the
major economic powers. Competition law, to conclude, must be
addressed to this challenge of international society.

94. Bull, op. cit. supra n.3, at p.315.

